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PREMATURITY AND OBITER DICTUM
IN INDIAN JUDICIAL THOUGHT
William D. Popkin*
I. Introduction

The judicial doctrine of prematurity of a suit is de
sure that courts act efficiently.1 This is not as simpl

order to know what is efficient, we need to know

must have some idea of what we want the institution
ciary to do, i.e. its goals. And we must further be awar

limitations. Within the boundaries of its limitations there is room for

experimentation as to goals.
Indeed, this is true of all living things, be they viable institutions

or human beings. The average person can walk or run at a limited
speed, but given what nature has allotted to him, he may choose his
direction. Notice that there can be heated argument on two subjects.
The direction or goal of travel is the one that often catches the imagi-

nation. But just as important is the speed at which he can travel.

This is equally open to debate and must be resolved in deciding what
is the most efficient way to plan activity. A one mile walk to a restaurant may be worthwhile. But a five mile walk to such a place may
result in a consideration of other ways to spend one's time. If told that
a sick friend is five miles away, a walk in that direction may seem

more desirable, while a distance of one hundred miles may appear
totally beyond human endurance.

The limitations of speed and endurance play a double role. They
set the outer limits of human endeavour and act as factors in deciding
what to do within those limits. The more desirable the goal or direction, the more willing one will be to stretch the limitations of the
actor to reach the goal.
* Fulbright Student, Indian Law Institute 1961-'62; LL. B. (Harvard Law School).
1. The description "Premature" was used in Kundan Lai v. Hukam Singh , A.I.R.
1952 Punj. 115 and in State of Bombay v. United Motors, 55 Bom. L.R., 246, 254 (1952).
In S. Ambalagaran v. Neelamegam A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 160, 162, it was called an "anticipatory declaration."

This doctrine, in the United States, is most often called "ripeness" for judicial
decision: Jaffee, Administrative Law (1955) (Table of Contents) p. viii; Gellhorn &

l3yse, Administrative Law (1954) (Table of Contents) p. xiii.
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232 PREMATURITY AND OBITER DICTUM

The doctrine of prematurity is essentially concerned w

limitations of the judiciary. Much of the discussion of this d
describes as the outer limits of judicial capacity what are, in
the factors to be considered within the range of possible judi
proaches.2 This is especially important to remember in a com
law study where one must acknowledge that the solution to a
in one country is but one possible way to balance the factors
rather than a definitive setting of the boundaries of human

nation.

It will be best at the outset to state our conception of the assumptions behind this doctrine. If a case is premature, there may be two
basic reasons for feeling that the courts should withhold decision. (1) A

court acts efficiently only when a concrete and non-hypothetical
situation is presented to it. This enables the counsel to understand
fully the implications of the case and thereby to present their position
most forcibly. It also assures that judges will write opinions which are
concrete in approach and useful as guides for private parties seeking
to know what the law is. The more effective resolution of the actual

case before the court and the most meaningful judicial pronouncements for future planning result from a fully matured and concrete
case. (2) Courts are not necessarily the most effective means for settling disputes. Private compromise or political resolution may be more
suitable. There are several reasons for this. A judicial solution is not
the parties' solution. It may be best for the development of individual responsibility and initiative if private parties are given as much
opportunity for working out their own problems as possible. Furthermore, such solutions may actually be better for the parties. It is also
true that the court has limited time so that it must act only when it is
most needed. This need may not arise at the earliest stages of a controversy. Lastly, the public good-will which the courts enjoy is not
inexhaustible. The court may find it best to remain out of a heated
controversy lest the dissatisfaction of the losing party vent itself against

the judiciary. A fully matured case is one in which these problems
are least likely to occur, for other avenues of solution will have been
tried.

It is apparent from this introductory elaboration of the reasons
behind the doctrine of prematurity that the limitations placed upon
the judiciary are inextricably intertwined with its directions or goals.
2. See e.g. International L. & W. Union v. Boyd, 98 L.Ed. 650, 652 (1954), 337 U.S¿
222 (Frankfurter, J.) (too remote for the proper exercise of the judicial function).
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The over-riding goal of a judicial system is
by means of one person telling two or mor

Without a procedure for democratic rep
must provide men with a reason for acc

Courts, therefore, act with reference to som
ble men can accept as pre-existing in those

legitimate for the judges to draw in dev

facts situations assure a fuller understandin
present dispute to the legitimate authoritie
court to intrude when other solutions are p
the potential dissatisfaction with a solution
such dissatisfaction may ultimately impair
courts which is to settle disputes.

The purpose of this article is to ascertain

problems of prematurity. We want to kn

courts have been with this limitation on th

reasons behind this limitation. We also w

courts have reached their particular solution
II. Gases and Critique on Prematurity.
(a) Declaratory Relief : Specific Relief Act , sec. 42

A convenient place to begin our analysis is with cases of declara-

tory judgments under Specific Relief Act, sec. 42. For in seeking a

mere declaration of rights, parties often come to a court at an earlier
stage of a controversy than they would if coercive relief were being
sought.

The list of examples under this section is illuminating.3 Example
(c) provides that a covenant to set up a trust if the prospective settlor
becomes entitled to an amount of money may be examined to decide

if it is void for uncertainty. Several problems arise in such a case.
The development of facts may be useful since the issue of uncertainty
may turn upon events subsequent to the time of covenanting which
shed light upon the prior intention of the settlor. Furthermore, this

situation presents a serious problem of wastage of judicial time for
there is no assurance that the contingency of the receipt of money will

occur. It also discourages the individual solution of the problem involved ; because the settlor has the opportunity to use the court as his
3. O. P. Aggarwala, The Law of Specific Relief (3d Ed., Vol. II, 1961) pp. 808-09«
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234 PREMATURITY AND OBITER DICTUM

lawyer fori draftsmanship purposes, he may be discouraged fro

his own counsel.4

The majority of examples under the Specific Relief Act, sec. 42,
involve the question of property rights of a reversioner and related
questions of status, such as adoption.5 There is a judicial requirement
that the litigant must sue for the entire class of reversioners. A 1 956
Madras case 6 explained that one reversioner could not assert his individual claim because of the anticipatory nature of the decision which
might be rendered valueless by the passage of time. Presumably, the
reversioner who is bringing the suit might die and never gain posses-

sion. The court here recognized the problem of wastage of judicial
time, which has not been of concern under example (c).
However, even when the suit is for the entire class, the case could
be considered anticipatory or premature since the entire class may fail
to surviveē It is clear that a mere hope or very contingent interest in
the petitioner who seeks to represent the class will be insufficient

grounds for granting relief.7 This rationale applies equally well to
the entire class if the interest of the class itself is very remote or contingent.

In making sure that the petitioner representing his class is not
himself a very doubtful beneficiary of the judgment delivered, the
courts are also exhibiting an interest in that aspect of the doctrine of
4. Such a suit was premature at common law : Fyfe v. Arbuthnot (1857) 1 De
G. & J. 406; 98 R.R. 151.
5. O. P. Aggarwala, The law èj Specific Relief (3d. Ed., Vol. II, 1961) pp. 808-09,
Examples D, E, F & H ; Examples A & G deal with clouds upon the title of the
holder of a present possessory interest ; Example B deals with both the present
possessory interest and unborn reversioners.

6. S. Ambalagaran v. Neelamegan A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 160, 162.
7. Hari Kishen v. Hira A.I.R. 1957 Punj. 89, 90 : "

exercise of their discretion refuse to grant a declaratory decree

collaterals avoiding the transaction are very remote an

chances merely speculative." This statement may bar dist
even if it is a class action. In this case a distant collatera
suit began but who became distant due to subsequent legisla
Nagammal v. Agoramurthi A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 248, 249 ; (m
although the court has discretion where contingent interes

a question of the propriety and utility of the relief.)
D. Gopalarao v. T. V enkatadri A.I.R. 1957 A. P. 19, 21 : (h

Court was exercised against the petitioner because his inter
contingency).

of Razia Begum v. Anwar Beguni A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 88
discretion to assure that the proceedings are adversary;.
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prematurity which seeks to assure that the
most interested in the litigation. One reason
possible development of the fact situation is t
gating parties are the ones most concerned. T
nature of the proceeding and decreases the ris
date when the stare decisis or res adjudicata e
felt by other people. In this respect, premat
purposes of the doctrine of locus standi.

At present, Indian courts recognize that a
terest may be the subject of a declaratory acti
have noted the danger of an anticipatory dec
not likely to become one of the full owners

cases become analogous, therefore, to an ow
cloud on his title to real estate.10

The most doubtful aspect of the cases involving property rights
does not arise from the problem we have discussed so far, i.e. the uncertainty of the petitioner's direct and immediate interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Rather there is no assurance that there

will be a respondent who will question the petitioner's legal right
or status. In Nagammal v. Agoramurthi 11 it was sufficient that
the respondent was interested in denying the petitioner's interest.

In Bhoop Singh v. Tarif Singh 12 the judge said that the peti-

tioner's fear, not an actual challenge by the respondent, would be
enough. And in Mankawar v. Alt. Bodhi 13 the case was held mature

when there was a claim by the respondent to a status which was
adverse to the petitioner's interest. The respondent in Ramsunder

Bhagat v. Rambharasi Bhagat 14 had introduced a false recital in a will
which indicated a future intention to cause difficulty for the widow
after the petitioner's death. And, finally, in Jagat Ram v. Basanti 15 the

respondent made an assertion in a deed which could later serve as a
basis for the imposition of paternal responsibilities on the petitioner.
8. Mankuwar v. Mt. Bodhi A.I.R. 1957 M.P. 211, 213.

9. In Rani Jagannath v. Bhawani Singh A.I.R. 1955 M.B. 99, 100 the court was
very strict and insisted that the reversioner bringing the class action be the nearest
collateral.

10. See e.g. Karimunissa v. Alfuddin A.I.R. 1960 M.P. 76, 77.
11. A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 248, 250.

12. A.I.R. 1956 All. 392, 395 (dictum ; here the respondent was actually denying petitioner's parentage) .
13. A.I.R. 1957 M.P. 211, 213.
14. A.I.R. 1957 Patna 131.

15. A.I.R. 1959 Punj. 581.
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In all these cases a serious problem of prematurity exist
judgments present a gradation from the barest danger of d
petitioner to more tangible evidence of interference with h

But people are always making claims out of court. It is
matter to be sure that they will cause trouble at some f

when the opportunity arises. Nor is it necessarily desirable

a petitioner to seek judicial aid in all matters. A private

amicable solution of what are very often family squabbles
be more desirable than sending one litigant away disappo

Two reasons are often given for granting a hearing.

a fear that evidence will be lost 17 or that false evidence will be

created.18 The assertion is that, far from being premature, there is
a danger that the facts in the case will grow old and distorted with
the passage of time. One Court did not find the danger of the creation of evidence sufficient justification for granting relief.19 In th
Kerala case a surety sought to intervene where the principal debtor

had conceded the case to the creditor. The surety alleged collusio
but was barred from a hearing because all his contentions could

raised at a time when he was sued. The Court did not explicitly state
that it was deciding a question of prematurity but the rationale was
the same.

Nonetheless, the problem of staleness of facts may be a real one,
despite the reluctance of the Kerala High Court. The danger isthat the
facts justifying relief on these grounds will be assumed to exist rather
than demonstrated. The opinions in the cases indicate that any asser-

tion of a claim in writing will amount to a genuine threat. No

attention is paid to its possible inadmissibility in evidence or its weakness as a self-serving declaration or to the surrounding circumstances
which may indicate that this incident is an isolated event, unsupport-

ed by any pattern of creation of evidence. The loss of evidence is
even more readily assumed to be a concommitant of the passage of
time. While witnesses die, records might be kept. Nor do the
16. See cases in footnotes 11-15.

17. Rani Jagannath v. Bhawani Singh A.I.R. 1955 M.B. 99, 101 ; Gosain v.
Mehman Singh A.I.R. 1955 N.U.G. No. 1621.

Cf. Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 886, 894 (declaratory judgments may "

to status.")

18. Jagat Ram v. Basanti A.I.R. 1959 Punj. 581 (creation of evidence also
indicative of intention to interfere with petitioner at future date) ; Ramsundar Bhagat v.

Rambharasi Bhagat A.I.R. 1957 Patna 131 (false recital in a written instrument).
19. Kochuvareed v. Kasim A.I.R. 1960 Ker. 342.
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opinions indicate the extent to which oral te

the case.

There may be another reason for giving judgment in the above
type of case, despite the uncertainty of a mature dispute. We have
earlier stated that the court's job is to settle disputes but that other
means for settlement often existed. Although we have suggested that
family disputes are best solved privately, it may be that the underlying

attitude of the Indian courts is to the contrary. While it is impossible for a foreign observer to feel any certainty in matters concerning
the Indian family, we would venture a guess that the emotional concern for the preservation of the family system is so great that the very
hint of a developing dispute evokes the urge to settle it by all means
available. It may further be that the potential bitterness is so great
when a crack in the wall of family relations appears that private settle-

ment is not very likely or satisfactory.20 Thus as the social value

behind the goal of settling disputes increases, the tendency to disregard
the limits based on the doctrine of prematurity increases.
(b) Declaratory Relief : Injunctions and Writ Petitions

The problem of prematurity is not limited to Specific Relief Act,
sec. 42. Declarations are sought in many other situations along with
pleas for injunctive relief and writ petitions and it is to those cases
that we now turn. In State of Madras v. Champakam D or air ajan?1 a

Brahmin sought to challenge a state rule which reserved places in
educational institutions to backward classes. She claimed a violation

of her rights under Article 29(2) of the Constitution, which guaranteed

no bar to admission on account of caste. She had not yet applied

for admission in the school. The need here was not the fuller

development of facts in order to give a more complete understandin
of the legal problem. Her status and the implications of the rejection
of her application would not be made clearer by an actual rejection.
In this respect, this case resembles the cases under Specific Relief Act
sec. 42 concerning property rights and status. However, judicial restraint was called for here for the other reason we have noted, namely

to allow another resolution of this nascent dispute if it was at al
possible. The court was injecting itself into an area of great socia

sensitivity. The issue was a purely legal one, but the emotions involv
ed in this Communal Government order, designed to raise the status

20. Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 886, 894 (declaratory judgments prevents future litigation by removing existing causes of controversy) .
21. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 226.
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of the depressed masses, must have been great. The Court

unmindful of the problem. For it stated that normally it wou
give judgments to those who had not yet indicated that they w

act as to call into play a piece of legislation which they so

challenge.22 The Court, nonetheless, found that the " peculiar c

stances " of the case justified giving an opinion though wh

circumstances were remained undisclosed.

The communal government order was struck down and the direct
result was the First Amendment Act making constitutional any unequal treatment resulting from social legislation for backward classes

or Scheduled Castes and Tribes.23 It is surely a debatable question

whether courts can put themselves in a position where legislatures will
be quick to reverse them, especially when the Court has reached the

tender age of one year.24 The doctrine of "finality of a judicial

judgment " has as one of its primary purposes the prevention of a loss

of judicial prestige due to a non-judicial reversal of a judgment.

Tehnicaliy, a legislative abrogation of an opinion is not a violation of
the doctrine of finality since the judgment itself is res adjudicata.
However, when the specific rationale of a judgment is immediately reject-

ed by a legislative pronouncement, much of the same downgrading of

the judiciary may be produced in the public mind. In this case the

Court could have made it clear whether the petitioner was in earnest
about attending the educational institution or whether she was just a
crusader for a legal principle which otherwise had no application to
her. The adversary nature of the dispute would then be assured and
the Court would not either waste time or prematurely involve itself in
matters of great political import.
In Kochunni v. State of Madras 25 the Court dismissed the objection

based on grounds of prematurity. The objection here was that the
22. State of Madras v. Champakan Dorairajan A.I.K. 1951 ¡S.L.. Il b , 111 ; the
Court also considered it relevant that no objection had been taken though normally
none is necessary to raise a jurisdictional question. This further indicates the Indian
courts' discretionary approach to prematurity (see fn. 7).
23. Basu, Shorter Constitution oj India (3d Łd., íybU) p. Dy (re: Article ID (*) ot
the Constitution).

24. V. G. Ramchandran, The Rote oj tne Judiciary in inaepenaent inaia a.i.k.
1954 S.C.J. 95 (to set at naught a judicial verdict by an act of Parliament is not
always healthy or wise ; but see R. Sharma, The Supreme Court in the Indian Constitution

(1959) (hereinafter referred to as Sharma) p. 278 (nullifying Supreme Court decisions
is just resolving a natural conflict born of constitutional and social change).

_ 25. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 725.
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state, as the respondent, had not yet taken

sions of the statute. It is thus the opposite of

where it was the action of the petitioner
sure. The Court found that the statute in

of the petitioner's property interests upon it

to do so, and that no notification or othe
for this result. The Court said that a thre
be required if state action were necessary
tioner's rights.

However, Judge Wanchoo was not comp

petitioner's apprehension that he would

words of the statute was justified.26 He w
to the statute had been solely on the grou
protection clause of the Constitution, Art

the petitioner to " lead evidence " to sh

whose status the statute intended to affect

This objection is based on the inadequat

situation which leaves uncertain both the p
cation to the particular petitioner and the

application. For these purposes a threat
mally be very useful.

As to petitioner's additional challenge, g
(the right to acquire, hold and dispose of
had doubts which did not lead him to the
tion of prematurity. Although not explai
tinction between Articles 14 and 19 in this
must have meant that the likelihood of pe
Article 19 from the effect of this statute was much clearer. Thus
regarding Article 19(1 ) (f) the further development of the facts was not
as crucial.

Indeed, there were facts in this case which made it much stronger

on the point of prematurity than either the majority or Justice
Wanchoo owned. On the assumption that the impugned statute

covered the petitioner's property, other private persons had claimed
ownership of the property, were soliciting payments of rents to themselves and had begun litigation to enforce their claims. The facts had,
therefore, matured to indicate who were the proper parties despite the

absence of a threat of action by the state. The actual threat to the
26. Kockunni v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1959 S.G. 725, 735.
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petitioners from private parties ensured that they could le

claim a grievance in a law suit. And, because these threa

grounded on a statute passed by the state, the state could p
made a respondent in the case.

Furthermore, the imminent danger of substantial injury
loss of rents guaranteed the existence of a dissatisfaction w
Court might well have felt worth its while to dispel. No
danger comes from a threat a immediate action by the respo
in this case was the state. But there is no reason why th
action may not come from a third party acting in reliance u
taken by the respondent, here the passage of a statute.

However, there is a danger in relying upon individua

springing from an assumption about the meaning of the law
the state. When this very case came up later on the merits a
v. Madras and Kerala , the Court held the statute unconstitu

Whenever a threat comes elsewhere than from the resp

the Court must make sure that there is a reasonable basis in the

respondent's action, i.e., the statute, for the threats. Otherwi

the admitted burden of the threat cannot really be considered as imm
nent in so far as the state as respondent is concerned.

This may be readily seen if we look at a suit against the sta

based on threats by other private parties as, in reality, a suit aimed
those private parties with the state compulsorily joined as a necessa
party. The procedure is not one of suit against the private parties
joinder of the state, but the purpose may be presumed to be the sam
To allow a petitioner to accomplish what is, in effect, a compulsory
joinder of the state in a case where the private threats are groundl
would be to inconvenience the state at the whim of a scared petition
Furthermore, the state cannot be considered a necessary party if i
statutes do not afford some reasonable basis for the threats made to the

petitioner. A direct suit against the state should, therefore, be ruled
premature if the injury springs from groundless threats and if the state,

itself, has not threatened action.

Our analysis further indicates that the majority was too quick to
seize upon the self-executing nature of the statute. That, in itself, is
not an adequate basis for finding a case mature. In reality, no statute
is self-executing in the sense that it may affect rights by a mere statement that those rights are changed» People must at least consider the
27. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1080.
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statute unconstitutional. The rea] question
danger to the petitioner from respondent
the pressure for judicial settlement may ou
If this is the test, a " self-executing " stat
while a statute that does not purport to c
may be a serious danger if people begin t
its eventual implementation.29
State of Bombay v. United Motors 30 pre
problem of prematurity. The Court noted

had been made to petitioner's case on t

without going on to discuss the merits of

was to be imposed and it was challenged

Article 286 of the Constitution, which pro
purchases occurring outside the state. Read
promulgated under it, the Court held that

The Court was required to interpret the
of its taxation provisions was beyond the s
the lower court, it was urged that since n

made on the petitioners, the case was

below, 31 indicated that if the petitioners
the state would levy an assessment, that w
maturity ; 32 but the learned Justice also r
on a further rationale and it is this holding

trative of a new facet of the doctrine of prem

The statute in question also had a requir
get a license.33 The factor in the balance w
nence and burdensome nature of the injur
undergo. The need for more facts persists
the state will act continues. However, the

diate injury in a way we have not yet

28. U.S.A. v. Storer Broadcasting Co. 100 L. Ed
(Harlan, J., dissenting in part at p. 1093 of L.Ed.).
29. CBS v. U.S. 86 L.Ed. 1563 (1941), 316 U.S. 407.
30. A.I.R. 1953 S.G. 252, 255.

31. 55 Bom. L.R. 246, 254 (1952).

32. Were this rationale alone conclusive, this case would be open to all our
prior objections based on the uncertainty of the respondent's action. Without a
threat of assessment we do not know if petitioner is a proper party. Furthermore,
administrative application to concrete situations is especially useful in giving meaning
to taxing statutes ; the court here was willing to use the rules to interpret the statute,
but rejected the aid of future administrative practice*

33. 55 Bom. L.R. 246, 254(1952).
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placed on the horns of a dilemna. It is not that the state

threatens action, but rather that the petitioner must either compl

the statute, waiving the chance to challenge it and incurr
burdens of compliance, or he must undergo the burdensome
for failing to apply for a license.34

There is a great irony in the fact that the dilemma and hen
injury is most acute when the statute is most vague ; yet it i
there is the greatest vagueness that the development of facts
greatest importance in demonstrating the application of the st

the petitioner.35 It is undeniable, however, that this dilem

cause a burdensome and immediate injury, especially in modern
where the multiplication of state controls increases the press
private planning.36

Another case where a " dilemna " proved decisive was

Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar ,37 There the Supreme Court fo
the requirements of registration, filing returns and inspection
ments, combined with the penalties for failure to comply wi
requirements, provided a case ripe for decision. The High Cou
found the case premature, 38 urging that the facts of the case
yet been investigated, no liability had been determined and n
ment had been made. The Supreme Court emphasized the mag
of the petitioner's dilemma and the injury therefrom and disr
the incompleteness of the factual development. The Supreme
citation of State of Bombay v. United Motors indicates that it
dilemma in that case which proved'.decisive, rather than the m
hood of assessment.39

However, it should be noted that when the imminence of the
injury is due to a dilemna and not an actual threat by the respondent,

the analysis we have been making becomes more complicated. The
injury must, of course, be burdensome ; i.e., compliance must involve
substantial loss and the penalty for non-compliance must be serious.
But imminence is also required. This means that, in addition to some
34. See Davis, " Ripeness for Judicial Review ", 68 Harv . L. Rev . 1122, 1145 (1955).

35. In fact, the Bombay v. United Motors case was later over-ruled in Bengal

Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 661.

36. This appears to be the basis for the majority position in U.S.A. v. Storer
Broadcasting Co š 100 L.Ed. 1081 (1955), 351 U.S. 192 (at p. 1092 of L.Ed.).
37. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 661, 668.
38. Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1953 Patna 87, 89.

39. See paragraphs accompanying footnotes 30-36.
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guarantee that the petitioner intends to ac
there must be some assurance that the stat
a threat of either state or private action to
conclusion. It is especially important, there
wherein the petitioner's apprehension is re
urged that the threats of third parties wh
tion must be shown to have a reasonable basis in the statute. However

proper it may be to relieve doubts in some cases, 40 it remains a social
value that individuals stand up to the problem of resolving many doubts
themselves. When we remember that doubts often spring from vagueness, where the development of a concrete fact situation is most useful,
this point takes on added force.

In this case the Court over-ruled the State of Bombay v. United

Motors case, supra . This poses a more serious problem. In a case

where there is doubt that an assessment will be made, should the Court

take it upon itself to re-examine a decision given two years before,

and followed the year before by litigants who accepted it as the

supreme law ? 41 A case of doubtful maturity is no time to take risks
with the good will and prestige which the Court commands.
In some Supreme Court cases there is only a superficial analogy to

the type of dilemna discussed above and yet the case was decided
without even a notation of the problem of prematurity. In Vinod
Kumar v. State of //.P.42 a notification had issued bringing into effect a
land reform bill. Landowners apprehended that the provisions would
be unconstitutional if applied to them ; but many of the provisions

required further notification or some application by the tenants for
their implementation. There was no evidence that private reliance on
this statute was causing injury.

The analogy to a dilemma arises because there is a discretion in

someone to enforce the statute. The officiai responsible for the notifi-

cation had it within his power to make the law in issue apply
to the petitioners. But, in addition to there being no indication of the
imminence of any action by anyone, the burden of the erstwhile dilemma

is essentially different from what we have seen earlier. For the dilemma
to be burdensome, compliance with some rule that is challenged must
40. Davis, ,É Ripeness of Governmental Action for Judicial Review", 68 Harv.
L. Rev . 1326, 1368 (Sugg. 4), 1369 (sugg. 6) (1955).
41. Himatlal v. State of M.P. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 4U*, *UD ; lor a criticai view
of this reversal see Sharma, Ch. XIII.
" 42. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 223,224.
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involve some loss and non-compliance a penalty. But here comp
meant only waiting for the land to be taken. Non-compliance m
not waiting, i.e., continuing in the normal affairs of life. We lac
normal incidents of a dilemma which make a case mature for jud
because the governmental action which is challenged does not cal
the petitioner to do anything out of the ordinary or impose a pe

for his continuing in his normal ways.43 Nonetheless, the
embraced difficult and potentially volatile questions involving

reform of the old feudal land structure.44

Section 633 of the Companies Act, 1956, seems to codify the
doctrine that reasonable apprehension of a claim being made against
a person is sufficient to allow a court to grant a declaration of liability
or non-liability, even when the dilemma created by the apprehension is

spurious, i.e., not imminent or burdensome. The circumstances are
parallel to the type of case just discussed. Reasonable apprehension
of a claim being made against a person does not appear limited to
cases of actual threats, however good proof they may provide of that

reasonableness. No real dilemma exists for the petitioner ; he is a
worried man and nothing else, waiting to be sued or prosecuted for
breach of his duty as a director of a corporation. It is true that these
cases under section 633 are unlikely to contain difficult constitutional
questions; so we need not fear premature decision on such issues. But,
in a case where the claim feared is a private one, the chance of an outof-court settlement may be lost ; and, if the director of the corporation
fears a public prosecution, the court's time may be wasted if the state
fails to take the anticipated action.
The argument in favour of a judicial settlement under section 633
must be based on the theory that it is important to society that these

doubts be removed and a further development of the dispute be
avoided. There is no reason to withhold adjudication for the purpose
43. In Dunichand v. Deputy Commissioner A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 150, 151 a tenant was
in fear of eviction. Compliance with the law meant waiting for eviction while non-

compliance meant continuing his normal life. Here the petitioner withdrew his
petition since his allotment of land had not yet been cancelled.

44. False dilemmas existed also in Hathising Mfg. Co. v. Union of India A.I.R.
1960 S.C. 923, where factory owners sought an adjudication that they need not pay
compensation upon the closing of their undertakings even though no one had yet
demanded money from petitioners ; and in State of Rajastan v. Pratap Singh A.I.R.
1960 S.C. 1208, .where petitioners challenged a regulation exempting Muslims and
Harijans from paying a tax for police protection even though extra police had not
been hired and no tax had been threatened.
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of concretizing facts since the alleged brea
occurred. It may well be that in a develop

the managers of a business concerning
paralyzing effect which the society can

absence of an actual threat or a real dilemm

director from his state of worry may be o

be a legal injury. The importance of re

then outweigh the desirability of allowing

private compromise or of saving judic

would not limit the operation of section 6
a private claim, 46 but would extend to a f
well.47 However, the willingness to step i
directors of corporations does not mean th

every legal issue where a petitioner has
consequences.

Several of the points examined in our previous analysis were
recognized by the Supreme Court in Dr. JV. B. Khar e v. Election Commis-

sion of Indiai A citizen and prospective member of the Lok Sabha

sought to prevent the Election Commission from proceeding with the
polling for the election of the President of India. Under the Constitution, Article 71(1), the Court is required to resolve doubts concerning
the election. The Supreme Court first noted, without deciding, the
" extreme contention " of the petitioner that the doubts need not be
well founded before the Court is required to hear the petition. The
existence of a well-founded doubt is analogous to the requirement of a
threat of action by the respondent or an imminent and burdensome
dilemma in our prior discussions.
45. Doubts are often required to be dispelled by the Companies Act before a
concrete case arises. Reduction of share capital (sec. 100) and alteration of the
Memorandum of Incorporation (sec. 17) require judicial approval despite the absence
of a complaint.

A similar power of judicial review in advance of a complaint is shown by the
Industrial Tribunal's approval of out-of-court compromises; Krishnan Kutty Nair v.

Industrial Tribunal A.I.R. 1960 Ker. 31, 34 (prevent over-reaching by a strong

employer).
46. It was so limited by Dan Singh v. Registrar of Companies A.l.K. lybU All. 160,
161.

47. In re Bank of Deccan Ltd. A.I.R. I960 Ker. 15, lb ; that this case was the
correct interpretation is made clear by the 1960 amendments to the Companies Act,
1956, sec. 633 (2), adopting this view.
48. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 694.
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However, the Court assumed the existence of a well-founded

and turned to the question of when such doubts are to be re
This question has its parallel in our former discussion of wheth
injury, even though it is imminent and burdensome, should
subject of a suit at the present time when it would cause the C
interfere with other means of solution or endanger its prest
involvement in politically heated controversy. The Court he

the election process must be completed first and it laid great stre
the general interest of the people in not postponing the election,
than on the grave doubts of the present petitioners.
There was at work here a consciousness of the extent to which an

adjudication of a premature case may interfere with other processes of
social experimentation equally as important socially as the resolution of

doubts and dilemmas.49 The Court was also probably aware of the
danger of involvement in a matter of great public concern. And yet

in cases discussed earlier the Court showed no concern for the social

value of experimentation with statutes, preferring to relieve doubts in

advance of the application of those statutes. Adjudication of a premature controversy where state action is challenged deprives the normally inarticulate public of its right to political experimentation by
granting the articulate petitioner the answers to questions about his
future security.50

Nor have Indian courts always been as concerned with the internal

political process as the Supreme Court was in the N. B. Khare case,
49. The reluctance to interfere with other non-judicial processes of solution finds
a parallel in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Like prematurity,
the purposes are two-fold : there is hope that the administrative tribunal will, through

its expertise and familiarity with the subject of litigation, better develop the fact
situation so that all of its implications will be understood ; and the courts may save
time or avoid difficult issues by allowing the administrative tribunal to attempt its
solution. See. e.g. N. S. Assurance Co. v. Mahal Singh A.I.R. 1960 Punj. 406 wherein
the Court held that the Tribunal's findings were only a report to the Insurance Claims
Board and were not final, i.e., they were subject to further administrative review and
elucidation ; but, even if they were final, the Court went on to say that the Board
could dispose of the case as it liked, given the final conclusion as to the facts, and the
High Court might never have to deal with the problem.
50. A similar reluctance to adjudicate where it would interfere with the political
process was shown by the High Court in Bharabendra v. State of Assam A.I.R. 1953
Assam 162 (petitioner cannot challenge legislation still in the stages of a bill) and in
Nirmal Bose v. Union of India A.I.R. 1959 Cal. 506, 518 (the Court refused to give judgment on complicated constitutional questions in advance of a firm decision by the
Prime Minister to act in a way which raised those issues, i.e., to dispense with the
approval of Parliament and order West Bengal to implement a mere executive order).
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supra . In Bombay Municipal Corpn . v. Ramcha

the consideration by the municipality of a
an injunction. The Court was urged to wait
passed but it rejected this contention on th
need not wait until damage is done if there
The Court did not analyze the voting struct
explain this likelihood. Nor was any concer
they were injecting the judiciary into the m
controversy, for the resolution dealt with t
in the State of Kerala.

In Allen Berry Co. v. Vivian Bose,52 the Court was asked to review
some aspects of a commission appointed to look into business practices.
There was nothing in the case to indicate that the points examined had

become relevant in any concrete case. It was admitted that no one

had yet claimed the privelege against self-incrimination. Nor does it
appear that the bias of the commission members, the justness of the
procedures or the appointment of investigating officers had caused any

danger to the petitioner. Yet the Court was willing to decide that

bias was not a disqualification, that the procedures were just, that officers could be appointed to investigate, and that the privelege against
self-incrimination could be claimed. Petitioner thus obtained a complete canvassing of the activities of a body assigned to do investigation
for the purposes of suggesting legislation in advance of any threat or
injury to himself.53
III. Gases and Critique on Obiter Dictum

Another method by which courts may anticipate questions not
necessary for decision is by giving obiter dictum. Dictum may have

all the dangers of a premature judgment. The facts and the argu-

ments on the point on which the dictum is issued may be vague and
undeveloped. Furthermore, the court may intrude upon sensitive areas
where other solutions have yet to be tried and for which other solutions
may be better. However, the primary arguments in favour of taking
cases of doubtful maturity do not exist where dictum is concerned.

Those arguments were based on the danger of the development of
51. A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 58.

52. A.I.R. 1960 Punj. 86.

53. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538, 546-47
(investigative bodies with power to recommend, but not to enforce, are of great

importance to the government in deciding how to legislate).
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doubts into unmanageable disputes and the social cost to a

economy of such doubts. But dictum, by definition, is
holding in a case. The need for settling doubts and dis

particular case before the court has been fulfilled by that
the other hand, dictum may serve a useful purpose in lead
in the direction which it will take in the future. Unnec
nouncements, if not recklessly anticipatory of future ques

pinging upon sensitive political areas, may encourage t

judicial debate which is the stuff of creative judicial law-m

Two very different kinds of dictum must be noted at t
(1) the court may refuse to discuss a point of law applicable
of the case, but unnecessary for decision of the case becau
legal holding made it superfluous; 55 (2) or the court may re
a statement of law broader than the actual facts of the ca

The use of the two types of dictum may have differen
the first case, it is likely that the relation of the law to the

case has been thoroughly argued. The main reasons for
judicial pronouncement are the unwillingness to inject the
difficult and far-reaching questions of law until necessary,
age of judicial time, and the risk that the judges will not re
themselves with the legal reasoning behind their assertions

Thus, in Delhi Cloth & Gen . Mills Co. v. Harnam Singh ,5
refused to decide a question which " bristled with difficult
it was unnecessary in view of the holding in the case. And
Madras v. Gurviah Naidu 59 the Supreme Court deftly avoid

54. See Surajmal v. State of M. P. (FB) A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 103, 110
55. Abdul Khan v. State of Mysore A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 355, 356.
56. State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 10, 15; an exhau

of Articles 21 (1) & (2) of the Constitution was withheld and decision
application of that Fundamental Right to the facts of the particular cas
57. Two examples from High Court cases will demonstrate this inv
difficult and important questions: Debi Soren v. The State A.I.R. 1954 Pa
contained a long dictum supporting the constitutionality of a statute
apply to the defendants in the case ; and in Nirmal Bose v. Union of I
Cal. 506, the Justice said that the central government's action was not i
judicial scrutiny as an Act of State, that relief could be given against W
suggested that executive action might be unconstitutional without legis

- all this despite the fact that materials were inadequate for a final
reached, p. 509, and governmental action was at too premature a
decision to issue, p. 518.

58. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 590, 597.,
$9. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 158, 161^62.
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issue concerning the propriety of the High C

cate of fitness for appeal to the higher C

certificate was dispensed with by the grantin
There are numerous other cases where the S
discuss points of law because a decision on a
unnecessary.61

With the second kind of dictum, in additi
ties, we also have a grave risk that the applic

statement of law to fact situations not before the court will be inade-

quately understood and argued. 62 Therefore, in The Supdt.> Central
Prison v. Dr . Lohia 63 the Court refused to say whether a statute, held
to be an unreasonable restriction upon a Fundamental Right, could be
redrafted to avoid a claim of unreasonableness in the absence of a

particular case presenting this question. And in Basheshar Math v. I .
T. Commr ,64 two judges rigidly limited the issue of individual waiver
of Fundamental Rights to Article 14 of the Constitution which alone
was relevant in the case, refusing to become involved with the general
question of waiver of Fundamental Rights.
However, the Court is not of one mind on this issue and has often
yielded to the impulse to speak on a point of law. Even in the Delh

60. A similar desire to avoid difficult constitutional questions was shown m
Aswini Kumar vē Arabinda Bose A.I.K. 1952 S.C. 369, 370 (" . . . we desire to guard
ourselves against being taken to have decided that a proceeding under Article 32
would lie after an application under Article 226 for the same relief on the same facts

had been rejected after due inquiry by a High Court. We express no opinion on
that point."). See also Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad A.I.R. 1950 S.C.
217, 226.
The policy of avoidance of such issues is built into Article 228 of the Constitution
where the High Court must decide a question of constitutional law only if it is necessary for the disposal of the case.

61. S. Gurmel Singh v. Pratep Singh A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 122, 128; Abdul Shakur

v. Rikhab Chand A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 52, 56 ; Shyam Behari v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1957 S.C.

320,324; Pathak <5- Sons v. I.-T. Commr. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 456, 459; State of Bombay
v. Narottamdas A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 69, 75.
62. A possible exception to this is the unusual case where the more general
proposition of law is treated as being raised by the specific facts of the case, to the
explicit exclusion of narrower points of law. This occurred in Central Bank of India
v. Their Workmen A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 12, 28. This Court refused to answer two questions
about specific types of salary bonuses involved in the case, because argument was
presented only in terms relating to salary bonuses in general and no evidence had
been presented on the more specific points.
63. A.I.R. 1960 S C. 634, 642.
64. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149, 157.
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Cloth & Gen . Mills v. Harnam Singh case,65 after noting the diffic

the issue, the Court indicated in which direction it was leanin

though refusing to give a final opinion. And in Basheshar
/. T. Gommr.,66 two justices did not limit their opinion

question of waiver of Article 14 rights but specifically made
marks applicable to other rights not at issue in the case.67

The willingness to hint at broader holdings than nece
has led to constitutional amendments being passed. In
Ahmad v. State of U.P .68 the Court gave a gratuitous hi
state monopolies may violate Article 301, 69 unless they

reasonable restrictions on private enterprise. No decision on t

was necessary since the case was disposed of on other grou

the result was Clause 4 of the Fourth Amendment Act, assur
continuation of state schemes of public ownership as again
based on Article 301. 70 The solemn step of a constitutional am
was precipitated by a casual and unnecessary dictum. Indee
not ēven dictum. It was an outlining of the arguments pro
with an indication of possible solutions. Such is the danger
the most explicitly non-authoritative pronouncements.

It has been suggested that these amendments following
statements do not cause damage to the Supreme Court.71 But
not help matters when the people tell the Court that it is wro
the fundamental desires of a nation. It is, of course, true tha
Court is expected to maintain strict impartiality and aloofnes

politics. However, it is equally essential that the public d
consider the Court to reside in an ivory tower. Confidenc

judiciary depends on both extremes being avoided. Sensitivity
broad social aims of the people is not concern with politics. W
court finds itself in continual disagreement with the country
basic law, it runs a risk of losing the prestige and confidence
its power to command respect for its decisions depends. It is c

not inadvisable for a court to avoid such a clash by avoid
necessary dictum.
65. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 590.
66. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149.

67. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149, 162 (Bhagwati, J.), 185 (K. Subba Rao, J.).
68. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 728, 741-42.

69. This Article guarantees free trade, commerce and intercourse throughout

India.

70. Amendment embodied iti Article 305 ; see Sharma, p. 275»

71. Sharma, p. 278.
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If we turn to the High Courts, we find a
dictum, although there are many cases whic
There is a variety of obiter ranging from a h
to comments on possible solutions,74 to an e
legal issues involved.75 Such an elaborate dis
difficult to distinguish from an alternative
holding is, by virtue of being a holding, disp
the court ; but it shares with dictum the ch

necessary, because another holding is sufficient

er's pleai The dictum which may be confu

holding is not the statement of law too broa

This could never be confused with an alte
a holding must refer to those facts. It is ra
unnecessary because another statement of law
difference between such dictum and an alte
largely on the intention of the judges. Since
been throughly argued because of the kind

real question is whether or not the judge

minds to the question and given a considere
a casual or off-hand statement of law. If th
the dictum rises to the level of being an alt
main arguments against such opinions rema
time and premature involvement in difficult

of law.

One High Court refused to give a legal opinion despite its specific

notation that full arguments had been made before it.77 However,
other courts have spoken when argument was presented for various
reasons. Sometimes it is considered sufficient that counsel have fully

72. Rameshwar v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1960 Patna 6, 8 ; Sadasiva Iyer v. State of
Kerala A.I.R. 1960 Ker. 327, 329; Munsha Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1960 Punj.

317, 322 ; Anand Municipality v. Union of India A.I.R. 1960 Guj. 40,43; Genamal
v. Ramaswamy A.I.R. 1960 A. P. 465, 470.

73. RameshwarPrasadv.ShyamBeharilalAJ.il . 1960 All. 741,743; Smt. Fulkala
v. Nathu Ram A.I.R. 1960 Patna 480, 484.

74. Ramgobind v. Askrit Singh A.I.R. 1960 Patna 342, 344; Narasayyamma
v. AndhraBank A I.R. 1960 A.P. 273, 282 ; Kishori Ram v. G. C. Agarwala A.I.R. 1960
All. 602, 606.
75. Debabrata Ghose v. Jnanendra A.I.R. 1960 Gal. 381, 386 ; Nirmal Bose v. Union
of India A.I.R. 1959 Cal. 506, 508-19.
76. See e.g. Kameschaw Singh v. I.-T. Commr. A.I.R. 1960 Patna 30, 31.
77. Mukunda Das v. Bidham Chandra A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 67, 74,
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presented the issues.78 Sometimes the possibility of reversal
grounds prompts the court to comment on a point which the
would make relevant.79 When the court gives a reason for it
we may at least feel confident that full consideration has been
the legal questions and that the opinion, therefore, is closer to
native holding than obiter dictum. When no reason is given i
to serious doubt if the court has carefully considered its opin
will sometimes happen that a judge will acknowledge that an o
unnecessary but then state his conclusions anyway.80
Two reasons which are usually given are based on the theo
time and energy have gone into arguments of counsel and th
should not be wasted. In the case of a possible reversal this h
weight for it may avoid reargument on a certain issue.81 But
the parties to the law suit do not stand to suffer by a reargum
mere fact that the case has been fully argued is no reason to
opinion. The parties have got what they wanted, a settlement
dispute. The litigants' effort may purchase a settlement but
faction of their curiosity as to some point of law.82
In the case of a casual hint or comment,83 it is even more
that the judge has not thought . through the full implication

78. Debabrata Ghose v. Jnanendra A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 381, 386.
79. Sanyasi Raju v. Karnap padu A.I.R. 1960 A.P. 83, 89 (no definite hold
comments).

80. Damodaran v. State A.I.R. 1960 Ker. 58, 63 (for finality sake).
81. cf. paragraphs accompanying footnotes 45-47 concerning the elim

concern among directors of corporations ; both situations present threats of
wastage.

82. Analogous to the problem of dictum is that of the mootness of a question.
In both situations no opinion on a legal issue need be given because events have made

it unnecessary. With dictum the event is the disposition of the case on another
ground ; with mootness it is the cessation of the dispute because of events outside the
courtroom.

In Narendra Nath v. Corp. of Calcutta A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 102, 104 a principle of law

clarified because a case had been fully argued and because it " ought to be clari
The issue was the consideration by the municipal council of resolutions of prai
censure for the Kerala State government. Political events had reshuffled power in
state so that the necessity for moving the resolutions had passed. Without regard
the question of mootness, the Court found against the city on an issue of ext

importance to the political functioning of the city council.
And in Guruswamy v. State of Mysore A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 592, 596 the Court was w

to enunciate the law although too great a time had elapsed for any writ to issu
nothing could be gained by a declaration.
83. Other cases where this type of dictum was given are : Sonar Bank v. Cal. E
College A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 409, 413 ; Bom. Municipal Corp. v. Ramchandra A.I.R. 1
Bom. 58, 61 ; Bansidhar v. Ramchandra A.I.R. 1960 M.P. 313, 315.
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statements. It might be thought that the
assertion would compensate for the lack o
we cannot assume that the weight given t
with the same rapidity as the judicial tho

comment or hint. In fact, we have seen

hint was relied upon to the extent of pas
ment.84 It is more likely that a judicial pro
casual, will carry weight with private parti
their activities or are contemplating litig

that no one should rely on dictum, esp
courts have spoken and the responsibility
tent.

Some High Courts have said that Supreme Court dictum is binding. The Bombay High Court has made it clear, however, that such

dictum must be a " considered opinion ", rather than a " passing casual
observation " and must be on a point which "arose for determination"
in the case.85 This would normally exclude the type of dictum which
is too broad for the facts of the case, for in that situation the point on
which dictum was given would not have " arisen for determination."
It also excludes those statements of law on points arising for determina-

tion which are dictum because they fall short of being alternative
holdings. As we have noted earlier, such pronouncements are dictum
specifically because they are " casual."
The dictum which can be binding will, therefore, normally be of the

type relating to the facts of the case, iģ.*., arising for determination in
the case, but made unnecessary for decision because of another statement of law.86 An example from a High Court case will serve to explain this kind of dictum. In DebiSoren v. State 87 the High Court found
the defendants innocent of sedition ; but they also said that the sedition law was constitutional in several pages of obviously " considered "

opinion. This discussion was not a link in the chain of reasoning
84. Sec text accompanying footnotes 68-70.

85. K . P. Doctor v. State of Bombay (FB) A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 220, 224 (held,
Supreme Court dictum was casual so not binding) ; Mohandas Issar das v. A, N, Satta tuUhan A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 113, 1 15-17 (Supreme Court dictum was on a point not arising
for determination so not binding, p. 118).

86. The one exception to this is the unusual case, noted in footnote 62, where
the broader proposition of law " arises for determination " and is " considered " to thç
explicit exclusion of the narrower issue.
87. A.I.R. 195% ratna 254.
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necessary for the holding of the case, for constitutionality wo

been pertinent tq the judgment only if the defendants wer
under the sedition law. Nor could it stand independently as an
native holding since it was not dispositive of the case. Non

this issue " arose for determination " since at the outset counsel could

not be sure his clients would be found innocent of acting seditiously.
To consider such dictum, if given by the Supreme Court, as binding is to show arļ especial fondness for obiter which is not in keeping
with the usual rule that only legal statements which resolve a dispute
are binding. It is an example of the Indian courts' refusal to engage
in expounding law only when they are required to settle a dispute, a

tendency which also finds expression in taking cases of doubtful
maturity. However, the Bombay High Court is far from endorsing all
types of Supreme Court dictum,88 as the Allahabad High Court has

apparently done.89 The latter Court's position is extreme in its inclusion of casual judicial assertions among that dictum which is
binding.
However, we do not wish to imply that casual dictum of whatever
kind is to be totally ignored, even if it is not to be binding. We have
already noted its creative utility in the dialogue of higher and lower
courts, a dialogue which is expressly dependent upon dictum not being
binding. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has, in fact, asserted its right
to use Supreme Court statements which go beyond the ratio decidendi
of the case if it finds them useful, even if it refuses to be bound by
them.90
IV. Conclusion

We have seen a tendency on the part of Indian cou
cate in many situations where a case was of doubtful
issue obiter dictum. The reasons for this willingness m

apparent from a brief comparison with the attitud

States federal courts. The U.S. federal courts have usu
the issue of prematurity, more often called ripeness, a

88. In fact, the Bombay High Court decision to follow buprem
itself dictum ; for in both cases where it asserted the binding natu

dictum (see fn. 85), it refused to follow the highest Court's statem
were either casual or on a point not arising for determination.

89. Union of India v. Firm Ram Gopal A.I.R. 1960 AU. 672,
circumstance of pronouncement of dictum immaterial).

9Q, Surąjmal v. M.P. A.I.R* 1958 M.P. 103, 110-11.
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question based on the terms " case or contro

the U.S. Constitution.91 The Indian courts have treated the matter

as one of discretion, considering the advantages and disadvantages of

judicial review.92 This difference in approach has meant a greater

unwillingness in U.S. federal courts to take cases of doubtful maturity.

That is not to say that there are no U.S. federal cases which advocate a more flexible approach. The dissent in the Boyd case 93 and the
majority in th eStorer and CBS cases 94 show a concern for the doubts of

citizens and for the dilemmas in which they can be placed by legislation

or other governmental action. The passage and upholding of the

constitutional validity of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the discretionary approach to this form of relief also indicate that the U.S.
federal courts are growing more flexible.95 However, this development is comparatively recent. There is still a large body of judicial

opinion resisting this development. In India the main trend is in

favour of flexibility and towards giving judgment in cases of doubtful

maturity or issuing obiter dictum. There is no significant body of
opinion against this approach and, in fact, there is little sentiment
that this is even a problem.

The fact that the U.S. federal courts' trend away from rigidity in

this matter is recent may give us a clue to the reasons for Indian
leniency. The Indian Constitution is a 20th century product. It is
now a commonplace generalization that the spread of governmenta

activity into many spheres of life has vastly complicated modern living.96 The sense of oppression and uncertainty that comes from the
intrusion of the government is a potentially disruptive factor in contemporary life. General dissatisfaction, if allowed to fester, could grow
91. Davis, ° Ripeness for Judicial Review," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1122, 1133 (1955) ;

and see fn. 2.

92. See fn. 7.

93. Internatianal L . & W. Union v. Boyd 98 L. Ed. 650, 652 (1953) 347 U.S. 222

94. See footnotes 29 & 36.

95. For a while it was expected that a Declaratory Judgment Act would be unconstitutional due to Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n. 72 L. Ed. 880 (1928), 277 U.S.
274 ; but such an act was held constitutional in Aetna Life Ins . Co. v. Haworth 81 L.Ed.

617 (1937); 300 U.S. 227 (declaratory judgment not the same as advisory opinion, at
p. 622 of L. Ed.). However, the power to give declaratory judgments is discretionary
within the constitutional limits of the power of the judiciary to decide cases and
controversies; Developments in the Law, Declaratory Judgments 194-1-1949, 62 Harv.
L. Rev . 787,805-17 (1949).
96. State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy A.I.R. 1953 S.G. 53, 58 (increasing complexity
of modern life urges a quick settlement of disputes, here involving labour trouble) .
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out of hand. This is especially true when the government is att
ing democratic revolutions involving deep inroads into ancient
interests.97

The dangers of allowing a dispute to develop are, therefore, m
greater than in earlier days. The social value in preventing disp

and of resolving doubts which are nascent disputes increase

terms of our original analysis, other channels of settlement seem fra

with danger and so courts are more often resorted to. It is, of c
true that the 20th century has come to the United States also, br
with it governmental impingement upon private affairs. But the

experience is different. We have already mentioned the deg

change which is being brought about in India. It is also true tha
latent forces of division due to great varieties of linguistic, cul
religious and social groups are continually near the surface. The
of settling disputes by means other than private or political ch
seems sufficiently urgent so that the limits of judicial competenc

be stretched further than in the U.S. federal courts.99

Indian conditions provide another reason for stretching the
capacity of the courts to handle cases of doubtful maturity to the limit.
The paralysis of private planning and the wastage of human energy
arising from doubts and mistakes concerning the law are major social
evils in a country emerging from centuries of economic standstill.100 It
may be worthwhile to gamble with the courts' prestige in a premature
grappling with large social issues rather than run the risk of timeconsuming political solution or a period of paralysis of activity due to

doubts and dilemmas. This statement of the reasons behind the Indian

willingness to overlook some of the risks of prematurity is in no way
meant to detract from the serious risks which we have earlier pointed
out. But it does indicate that the role allotted to the judicial system
97. See e.g. land reform cases in footnotes 25 & 42.
98. See M.V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India (1960) p. 439 (courts
prevents conflicts just as preventive medicine is administered by doctors); A. T. Mar kose,
Judicial Control of Administrative Action in India ( 1956) p. 605 (complexity of modern

age changes concept of the court from a provider of remedies for violated rights to

legal experts telling litigants about the law which they are willing to obey as
gentlemen).
99. Sheoshanker v. M.P. State Gov't. A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 58, 59 adopted the stricter

U.S. federal rule as the Indian approach. However, the flexibility we have so far
noted (see fn. 7) indicates that this is not the Indian rule.
100. cf. discussion of Companies Act, 1956, at footnotes 45-47 and accompanying
text.
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must be considered not only in the light
but also with the needs of the society fo
These needs indicate that the goal of jud
especially important in India.

It is also necessary for us to examine m
these major risks which the Indian courts

doubtful maturity and in issuing obite

Court, in its inception, tread a very caref
that it lacked a sense of security that it
had a keen sense of awarness of the reser

it could command. However, the Indi
secure in the assurance that it had the

statutes.102 This is both important in itse

attitude of confidence in the Supreme C
than in the United States. This basic attitude makes the element of
risk less of a danger than would originally appear.
In India, courts are considered absolutely impartial. They are the

one place and the judges are the one group of people in whom the

public can repose complete confidence when the vast administrative

machinery appears arbitrary and capricious. They are unequivocally
styled the protectors of Fundamental Rights and guardians of the
Constitution.103 One author has contrasted the strict impartiality and
freedom from politics of Indian courts with the situation in the United

States where there may be a suspicion that the courts are not always
free from political influence.104 Whether the appraisal of the U.S. or

Indian courts is accurate or not is immaterial. The crucial point is

the sense of confidence in Indian courts which this author's attitude

reflects. The way in which Indian courts are looked upon as repositories
101. Hudson, " Advisory Opinions of National and International Court", 37

Harv L. Rev. 970, 976 (1924).
102. Article 32 gives the power to the Supreme Court to enforce Fundamental
Rights ; a similar power is given to High Courts by Article 226. Article 13 (2) makes
it clear that laws abridging such rights are void. A similar result in the United
States was reached only by judicial interpretation ; Marbury v. Madison 2 L. Ed. 60
(1803).

103. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 124, 126-27.
By contrast, only a minority of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court characterize themselves as protectors of fundamental liberties : see e.g. Barenblatt v. US. 3
L. Ed. 2d 1115, 11139 (1959), 360 U.S. 109 (Black, J., dissenting) (courts are guardians

of the Bill of Rights).

104. Sharma, p. 307,
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of impartiality and legal wisdom may explain why they are inclined
give obiter dictum when there is no urgency for the settlement o
dispute at all. For the very bestowal of great respect upon courts m
encourage them to view their function of expounding law as independ
of their role as settlors of disputes.105

There are other signs of this exalted position of the courts. Whe
a constitutional issue is involved in a case it may be removed to th
High Court.106 When there is a substantial question of constitutio
law involved there is a right of appeal to the Supreme Court.107 T
must be reflection of the great prestige and weight which higher co
judgments carry and of a feeling that such important questions belo
in those courts. Significantly, in the U.S. federal system, there is
right of appeal to the Supreme Court merely by virtue of a consti
tional question being involved,108 and the Court of Appeals (rough

comparable to the High Courts) does not get a case until the low
court is finished with it regardless of its constitutional content.

The attitude towards contempt of court from newspaper articl
reflects the ready willingness to punish attacks on this judicial prest

There is an obvious sense of the need to guard this prestige wh
springs from a sense of the importance of the public image.1

Similarly, Article 211 of the Constitution forbids legislative discuss

of the activity of the High Courts or the Supreme Court in
discharge of their duties.

Furthermore, there is no feeling in the Indian tradition of hig

regard for the litigious minded person anxious to pursue his s

interest. Either self-effacement or resort to the advice of wiser

and elder personages might often be preferred in comparison with
the pressing of an adverse claim. The Supreme Court itself may
derive some of its special prestige from an unconscious association
with such a distinguished body of elders. And the tendency to
105. Sharma, at p. 305 and Ch. X notes approvingly the practice of making
asides and off-hand comments by the Indian Supreme Court while stating that it is
not normal for courts of high status and is disliked by " professional M lawyers.
106. Article 228 of the Constitution of India.

107. Substantiality in Article 132(3) means only that a difference of opinion
exists, not that the issue is of general importance ; Jang Bahudin v. Mohindra College

A.I.R. 1950 Pepsu 61.
108. The Court's discretion must be appealed to ; 28 U.S.C.A. 1254 (1) (from

Courts of Appeal in federal system) and 1257 (3) (from state courts).
109. Asunni Kumar v. Arabinda Rose A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 75, 76 (apology for impugning Court's motives).
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accept the courts' role in cases of doubtf
based on a tradition of respect for the bo

bring relief from the pressures of a nascent d
proceeding.110

A further factor which contributes to a sym
tendency to deal with more abstract cases is t
colleges throughout most of India. Students
the case-method of study or the Socratic (qu

teaching except in a few isoltated cases. T

which views the law less as concrete applicat
more as abstract general propositions. This h

Allahabad High Court could base its opini

obiter is binding upon Article 141 of the Con

"law declared by the Supreme Court" is bin
conception of law as generalizations which ca

within its definition.

The foregoing analysis indicates that the capital of good will and

respect upon which the courts may draw when deciding cases of
doubtful maturity or issuing obiter dictum is much greater than might
at first be apparent. This respect for the courts suggests that the power
to settle disputes which are volatile or which would otherwise receive
political attention is fairly secure since the social pressure and individual
inclination to accept the courts' decision is great. Whatever risks there
may be of loss of prestige from interference in private and political
matters may, therefore, be worth taking.

The truth of this assertion cannot be fully tested, however, until
the ruling party in India loses its present over whelming majority,
capable of easily amending the Constitution. Until now governments
disapproval of a judicial pronouncement has led to easy revision of the
basic law. The full clash can only occur in the future and the courts'
prestige will then be fully tried. It must also be remembered that the
courts' prestige is no remedy for undeveloped facts and an excessive
judicial workload.
Moreover, the danger of judicial over-confidence remains. Social
upheavals unleash energies which the most respected of courts may not

110. Ghattopadhyaya, Traditional Values in Indian Life (Indian International
Centre, 1961) p. 29.
111. Union of India v. Firm Ram Gopal A.I.R. 1960 All. 672, 680»

This content downloaded from 129.79.132.155 on Fri, 28 Jul 2017 18:02:13 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

260 PREMATURITY AND OBITER DICTUM

be able to settle. Erosion is a slow process.112 The extent to which

has occurred can only be known when put to the test. If it i

true that the reservoir of respect for the judiciary is limited, how
great it may be, the courts must consider that someday they may

all of their prestige to meet a particular challenge. At that tim

will matter if the court has judicially conserved its strength. The gi
of decisions in cases of doubtful maturity and of obiter dictum is o
potential source of exhausting that strength.113.

112. One possible source of erosion already exists in the compulsory retirem
age for judges. Suspicions may grow that the appointments of judges after re
ment to various positions will gradually lead them to temper opinions whic
anti-government .

113. In another Article " Advisory Opinions in Tndia " (to be published

Vol. IV No. 3 of this Journal) the author tests some of the hypotheses developed a
The problems of maturity of facts for an accurate and effective decision and the
attendant upon a court's unnecessarily intruding into private and political affair
further examined. [Ed.]
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